Kerberos Attacks and Active Directory Security: Defending Against Credential Abuse
Firdoshi | Date: Nov 16, 2026

What Is Kerberos?
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol that verifies the identity of users and services without repeatedly sending passwords across the network. It provides authentication for users, computers, applications, and resources within Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS).
There are three main components:
Client: The user or computer requesting access to a resource.
Key Distribution Center (KDC): The authentication component, usually hosted on an Active Directory domain controller.
Service Server: The application or resource the user wants to access.
Kerberos authentication generally follows these three steps:
Client authenticates against the KDC—This provides the client with a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT).
Client uses the TGT to request a service ticket for a specific application/resource.
The client uses the service ticket to authenticate against the service. The service checks the ticket is valid and allows access.
This means that there is less of a risk of exposing passwords; however, if attackers can access Kerberos tickets, they will want to get hold of the encryption keys as well.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework documents how attackers steal or forge Kerberos tickets to impersonate users and gain unauthorized access.
7 Kerberos Attacks Your Team Should Know About
Understanding these attacks can help security teams identify weaknesses before they lead to wider Active Directory compromise.
Kerberoasting: An attacker targets service accounts associated with Service Principal Names (SPNs). They request Kerberos service tickets and attempt to crack the encrypted ticket material offline.
If the service account has a weak password, this can be an effective way to obtain its credentials. A compromised account may provide access to databases, application servers, and other enterprise resources.
AS-REP Roasting: This attack targets Active Directory accounts that have Kerberos preauthentication disabled. Attackers can request authentication responses and attempt to crack the encrypted information offline.
Preauthentication should be enabled by default. Security teams should regularly review accounts with exceptions and confirm that those exceptions are genuinely required.
Golden Ticket: This involves the attacker creating falsified TGTs using cryptographic keys that they have obtained from the KRBTGT account within the domain. This could give the attacker a large amount of impersonation.
It is important to make sure that you protect your domain controllers and KRBTGT credentials, as this can cause issues across the whole domain.
Silver Ticket: The attacker will create falsified service tickets, using cryptographic keys obtained from the service account. This will usually only target a specific service/resource. They can also be difficult to detect, as they may not have to obtain the ticket from the KDC.
Pass the Ticket: The attacker steals existing Kerberos tickets from compromised systems. They can use these tickets to impersonate real users. This can cause lateral movement, as the attacker does not need to know the actual password.
Kerberos Delegation: Delegation allows services to access resources for users. If you have too many permissions or incorrect configurations for unconstrained, constrained, and resource-based constrained delegation, then it can cause issues.
DCSync: This exploits the permissions available for Active Directory replication. Attackers can request password-related information from the domain controller. If they have gained privileged credentials, they may use these to compromise other accounts or create falsified Kerberos tickets.
For more detail on these techniques, see MITRE ATT&CK's Kerberos ticket abuse documentation.
How to Detect Kerberos Attacks

Monitoring failed logins alone isn't enough. Security teams also need visibility into how users authenticate, which service accounts are being used, what is happening on endpoints, and which changes are taking place within Active Directory.
Some Windows Security Event IDs worth monitoring include:
Event ID | Description | Security relevance |
4768 | TGT requested | Helps identify unusual authentication activity |
4769 | Service ticket requested | Useful when investigating possible Kerberoasting |
4771 | Kerberos preauthentication failure | Helps identify suspicious authentication attempts |
4770 | Service ticket renewed | Helps investigate unusual renewal patterns |
4662 | Directory object operation | Can help investigate DCSync when appropriate auditing is enabled |
5136 | Directory object modified | Helps identify unexpected Active Directory changes |
4728 | Member added to a global security group | Helps detect unexpected privilege changes |
Microsoft provides guidance on Advanced Audit Policy Configuration, including the settings used to monitor Kerberos authentication and service-ticket activity.
Security teams should also look for unusual service ticket requests, unexpected RC4 encryption usage, privileged accounts authenticating from unfamiliar systems, and unauthorized changes to delegation settings.
None of these indicators individually proves that an attack is taking place. However, correlating authentication events with endpoint activity and established user behavior can help improve detection.
Best Practices for Securing Active Directory
Preventing Kerberos attacks starts with reducing weaknesses in identity management and Active Directory configuration.
Secure Service Accounts
Where possible, use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs). Windows automatically generates and manages these passwords, reducing the need for administrators to manage service account credentials manually.
Also:
Remove unnecessary service account privileges.
Review accounts associated with SPNs.
Remove unused service accounts.
Use long, randomly generated passwords for accounts that cannot use managed accounts.
See Microsoft's Group Managed Service Accounts documentation for more information.
Update Kerberos Encryption
Organizations should prioritize AES encryption and identify applications or services that still depend on RC4.
Microsoft introduced a phased change to Kerberos RC4 handling in 2026. The April 2026 phase moved the default KDC behavior toward AES-first, while the July 2026 security update introduced final enforcement for supported Windows domain controller configurations.
This means organizations should review legacy dependencies rather than assume existing applications will continue to authenticate without changes. Microsoft's Kerberos RC4 detection and remediation guidance explains how to identify and address these dependencies.
Protecting Privileged Identities
Reduce the number of accounts in the Domain Admin group. Keep administrative accounts separate from everyday user accounts, and restrict privileged logon to trusted systems.
Privileged Access Management (PAM) and Just-in-Time (JIT) administration can also help limit how long elevated access remains available.
Review Delegation and Directory Permissions
Review unconstrained and constrained delegation settings, along with resource-based delegation permissions. Ensure that only authorized users and services can modify these configurations.
Directory replication permissions should also be tightly restricted to reduce the risk of DCSync attacks.
Secure Domain Controllers
Domain controllers are critical to an enterprise's identity infrastructure. Make sure they receive security updates, restrict administrative access, use endpoint detection and response, maintain secure backups, and monitor changes to important directory objects.
Strengthen Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) for privileged access and other sensitive workflows wherever supported.
However, MFA alone will not prevent offline ticket cracking or the misuse of already-issued Kerberos tickets. It should be part of a wider identity security strategy.
Tools That Can Help Secure Active Directory
A combination of identity monitoring, security analytics, and Active Directory assessment tools can help organizations identify and investigate suspicious activity.
Microsoft Defender for Identity: Detects suspicious identity activity and potential Active Directory threats.
Microsoft Sentinel: Centralizes security monitoring, event correlation, and investigation.
BloodHound: Maps Active Directory relationships and identifies potentially risky privilege paths.
PingCastle: Assesses Active Directory security posture and highlights configuration weaknesses.
Splunk Enterprise Security: Supports centralized security analytics and investigation. Semperis: Provides monitoring and protection capabilities for Active Directory environments.
Each tool serves a different purpose. The right combination depends on your infrastructure, licensing, security maturity, and operational requirements. No single product replaces good identity governance and secure configuration.
What Should You Do If You Suspect a Kerberos Attack?

A structured incident response process can help limit the impact of credential compromise.
Identify: Investigate suspicious authentication requests, affected accounts, source systems, and ticket activity.
Contain: Isolate compromised endpoints and restrict access to affected accounts while preserving evidence.
Investigate: Determine whether passwords, tickets, service account keys, privileged credentials, or KRBTGT material have been exposed.
Eradicate: Remove unauthorized access and correct compromised directory configurations and permissions.
Recovery: Restore trusted configurations, reset affected credentials, and verify domain controller integrity.
Monitor: Increase monitoring and review the incident to identify improvements to security controls.
If a domain-wide compromise is confirmed, resetting an individual user's password may not be enough. Microsoft provides specific guidance for resetting the KRBTGT password during Active Directory forest recovery. The process involves two resets, with appropriate waiting periods to account for ticket lifetimes and replication.
The Australian Cyber Security Centre's September 2026 guidance on detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises also covers credential theft, DCSync, Shadow Credentials, and other identity persistence techniques.
Key Takeaways
Kerberos tickets and service account credentials are valuable targets for attackers.
Weak passwords, excessive privileges, and poor delegation configurations increase Active Directory risk.
Monitor authentication events, service tickets, encryption usage, and directory changes.
gMSAs, AES encryption, least-privilege access, and privileged identity controls can help reduce exposure.
Maintain an incident response process that covers Active Directory and the wider identity environment.
Conclusion
Kerberos and Active Directory play a central role in enterprise authentication. If attackers compromise them, the impact can extend across applications, infrastructure, sensitive data, and business operations.
Rather than focusing only on password management, organizations need a more proactive approach to identity security. That means monitoring authentication activity, reviewing configurations, protecting privileged access, and regularly assessing the security of their Active Directory environment.
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